Statement by Konstantin Vorontsov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Meeting of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Geneva, 13 December 2023.
Mr. Chairperson,
We would like to congratulate you on the election to this responsible position. We trust that your adept leadership will facilitate the organization of constructive and depoliticized work. Please be assured of the support of the delegation of the Russian Federation.
In the context of fulfilment of obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the emergence of facts pertaining to the implementation of a military biological programme in Ukraine with support of the Pentagon and affiliated entities, including private companies, warrants closer attention. The analysis of available documents indicates the development of bioweapon components in close proximity to Russian borders. The legitimate concerns regarding these activities that violate the BTWC, formally raised by Russia at the Consultative Meeting under Article V of the BTWC, during open meetings in the UN Security Council to evaluate Russian complaint and proposal for an international investigation under Article VI of the BTWC, as well as at the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC and sessions of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BTWC, have not received a response. These matters remain open and need to be addressed. We shall demand that the American and Ukrainian sides take action to rectify the situation, thus eliminating this significant obstacle, which is detrimental to the BTWC regime and hinders progress within the Convention framework.
For a long time, the Russian Federation has openly made claims and expressed concern about military biological activities carried out under the guise of cooperation for peaceful purposes with the most direct assistance and participation of the US Department of Defence in laboratories outside American territory, including in the republics of the former USSR, far from the North American continent and near the Russian borders. Detailed information on this matter is contained in the relevant Russian working paper, as well as in the outcome report of the Parliamentary Commission on Investigation of the Circumstances Related to the Creation of Biological Laboratories by American Specialists on the Territory of Ukraine, distributed among the States Parties to the BTWC. US reporting, provided annually as part of the BTWC’s confidence-building measures, which were developed by States Parties “to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguity, doubt and suspicion”, continues to lack information on programmes and projects outside national territory and their funding.
The current situation confirms the need for consolidated efforts by the international community to strengthen the BTWC regime. Together with the vast majority of States Parties, Russia is convinced that the effectiveness of the Convention would be greatly enhanced if a universal, legally binding, non-discriminatory protocol relating to all articles of the Convention with an effective verification mechanism were adopted. The assertions by some delegations that the BTWC is allegedly unverifiable and that work in this area is futile are completely contrary to the conclusions of the experts of the VEREX group and the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, who concluded that verification measures can be useful in providing confidence that countries are complying with their obligations under the Convention. We have covered this subject in detail in the relevant Russian working paper, which contains specific proposals on the methodology for the formation of an effective verification mechanism.
We welcome the joint steps taken by the States Parties to the BTWC to strengthen the Convention institutionally within the framework of the specialized Working Group established by the decision of the Ninth BTWC Review Conference along the lines of Russia’s proposal. We believe that Russia’s initiatives designed to effectively strengthen the Convention regime are fully in line with the Group’s agenda. They include creating mobile biomedical units within the Convention to render assistance in case of the use of biological weapons and to help combat epidemics of various origins, introducing an investigative mechanism with regard to the alleged breach of obligations under the Convention in line with Article VI and founding the Scientific Advisory Committee which would analyse scientific and technical developments relevant to the Convention and provide recommendations to States Parties, as well as strengthening confidence-building measures within the BTWC by providing States Parties to the Convention with information on military and biological activities outside national territory.
We are convinced of the need for the international community to intensify its efforts to strengthen the expert and technical capacity of the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (SGM). Particular attention should be paid to the Mechanism’s basic principles and procedures which, except for the technical appendices selectively amended in 2007, have not been updated since their approval by UNGA resolution 45/57C of 4 December 1990. Designed more than 30 years ago, they do not quite meet the current realities of chemical and biological security. New challenges and threats have emerged, as well as a range of technical and methodological innovations that could enhance the effectiveness of the SGM.
In order to facilitate the implementation of this goal, on 14 June this year, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov sent a message to United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calling for a review of the existing SGM principles and procedures with a view to updating them. The whole group of countries supported the idea by aligning with the Joint Statement in Support of the Efforts to strengthen the SGM communicated in the First Committee of the 78th United Nations General Assembly and here in the MSP. Besides, a number of states forwarded similar calls to the United Nations Secretary-General. We expect that he will promptly begin the relevant review with the help of consulting experts and taking into account the proposals from the States Parties.
Mr. Chairperson,
We see the activities related to strengthening the BTWC regime as an opportunity to unite the efforts of the international community around a pragmatic, non-discriminatory and future-oriented agenda. This view was supported in toto by the participants to the Russia-hosted International Conference entitled “Global Threats to Biological Security. Problems and Solutions” last June in Sochi. Everyone interested is invited to attend a side event dedicated to the Conference and encouraged to get acquainted with our issue-related working document.
The meetings of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BTWC this year have shown that there are a number of issues on which the States Parties are able to form a consensus. In this context, we share the keen interest of most delegations in the issues of international cooperation and assistance under Article X of the Convention. We would be glad to see everyone at our side event dedicated to the advanced training courses for specialists in the field of biosecurity organized by Russian relevant agencies.
Mr. Chairperson,
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that the Russian delegation is ready for the closest cooperation with the Ecuadorian Chairmanship and all delegations to achieve concrete practical results. Russia calls for all the interested parties to get together for a creative work for the sake of strengthening the international security in the interests of ensuring arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We hope that taking into account each other’s interests and willingness to compromise will serve as a reliable basis for achieving workable and effective agreements within the BTWC.
Thank you for your attention.
